INTRODUCTION
One of the premises of this symposium is that the Obama administration, in undertaking various executive actions that protect some of the vulnerable immigrant populations in the United States, is acting in a more rights-protective manner than Congress has explicitly authorized. This Essay juxtaposes this perceived dynamic with policies in the counterterrorism and national security realm, areas in which the Obama administration has acted directly in contrast to its more rightsprotective stance taken in other areas.
National security is arguably an exceptional context when compared to other issues that touch on domestic and international law and policy, such as immigration. This Essay considers the exceptionalism of Obama administration national security policies, which have undercut civil and human rights in ways that disparately impact racial and religious minorities. Included in this analysis are the non-prosecution of those who endorsed torture of detainees, use of drones for targeted killings of citizens and noncitizens, invocations of the state secrets privilege, and use of immigration authorities to detain and remove those accused of having a connection with terrorist activity.
The latter part of this Essay situates the Obama administration's national security policies in the context of this symposium's examination of the horizontal and vertical separation of powers. In doing so, this Essay concludes that the rule of law distortion at both the domestic and international level is enabled by a pronounced lack of judicial engagement and review of most rights-denigrating national security programs, political enabling by Congress, and lack of sustained public pressure for reform.
I. EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM
The label of national security exceptionalism fits the Obama administration in two ways: first, although the administration has actively sought to address and improve the protection of human rights and civil rights of racial minorities suffering disparate negative treatment in a variety of contexts, those moves toward rights protection generally do not extend to the realm of counterterrorism abuses. Notably, in the post-9/11 counterterrorism context, almost all of those who have suffered from violations of human and civil rights are racial and/or religious minorities. 1 One of the justifications for this type of exceptionalism is based on the widespread view that national security is an area in which ordinary legal and constitutional constraints do not apply because of the strong deference that ought to be afforded to the president in foreign policy matters; 2 related to this type of exceptionalism is the outsized perception of the threat of terrorism by politicians and the public, which makes it difficult for the government to shift away from its exceptionalist footing. 3 The second mode of exceptionalism is predicated on the view that the United States plays an exceptional role on the world stage in terms of its responsibility to police global actions by exercising its hard and soft power; as such, it has the right to act in ways that would arguably not be tolerated by the United States if undertaken by a different nation. 4 
A. Improving Rights Protection in Some Non-security Contexts
Looking at almost seven years of his presidency, it is clear that President Obama has prioritized improving the government's footing on several human and civil rights issues, a number of which have focused on areas in which a racially disparate impact is obvious. For many of these areas, the Obama administration has undertaken its efforts unilaterally, despite a reluctant or sometimes contrary Congress. Immigration is one of these contexts, but other examples reflect presidential efforts toward better protections for racial minorities as well. 5 In the context of voting rights, President Obama immediately pushed back against the Supreme Court's gutting of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in its Shelby County v. Holder 6 decision of 2013, ordering the Justice Department to continue litigating voting rights cases aggressively and creatively while pushing Congress to that the risk of death from terrorism versus other causes is comparatively infinitesimal, yet government resources are not proportionately allocated); Nate Silver, Crunching the Risk Numbers, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 8, 2010) , http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703481004574646963713065116 (same as Campos).
4. President Obama's 2014 commencement address at West Point embodied a variety of arguably complementary, arguably conflicting thoughts on the notion of American exceptionalism. At one point, he noted, "I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being. But what makes us exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law, it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions." President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. (May 28, 2014), in U.S. GOV'T PUBL'G OFFICE, DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 2014, at 3, 7. At another point, he offered that "America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will," Id. at 3, and continued this theme with the following: The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it: when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just. International opinion matters, but America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life.
Id.
5. The following list of activities is meant to be selective, not exhaustive; further, if the scope of analysis were broadened to include issues for which racially disparate impact is not facially obvious, other unilateral rights-protective measures undertaken by the Obama administration could be considered, such as the broadening of workplace, health care, and marital tax filing protections for LGBTQ federal employees.
6. Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
restore the protections removed by the Shelby decision. 7 On the issue of racially disparate sentencing for non-violent drug-related crimes, President Obama not only signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 8 and encouraged the reduction in mandatory minimum sentences, 9 but has also exercised unilateral executive action to encourage those sentenced under the prior racially disparate sentencing framework to seek clemency, 10 and continued to use his clemency power to order the release of some of those convicts. 11 With regard to unarmed racial minorities being harassed, abused, or killed by police, President Obama has spoken out forcefully, moved toward the demilitarization of local police forces, 12 ordered better training and controls when federal military equipment is transferred to state and local police departments, 13 emphasized the need to improve community policing, 14 and created a task force to "strengthen public trust and foster strong relationships between local law enforcement and the communities that they protect, while also promoting effective crime policies or aspects of the administration's decision making. In rare instances, the Obama administration has paid compensation to individuals who were abused in some way due to national security overzealousness during the Bush administration, 20 but this has been more of an exception than the general practice of the administration, which has been to use a variety of tactics to seek dismissal of lawsuits seeking recompense for national security abuses and to cover up abuses when possible. 21 For example, despite President Obama's statement affirming the illegality of torture, a continuing United Nations investigation into U.S. torture, 22 and ample evidence made public by the Senate that torture was committed by U.S. government agents under the George W. Bush administration, 23 the Obama administration has made no moves toward seeking accountability for those who authorized, supervised, ordered, or carried out the torture. This is particularly noteworthy in the context of this symposium, which considers whether and the extent to which the Obama administration has gone above and beyond congressional authorization in granting protections and rights to certain immigrants; in the case of torture, we see not only a lack of accountability over the responsible individuals, but also a years-long fight by the Obama administration to keep the detailed findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence secret and out of public view. 24 Where the Senate acted forcefully to detail human rights abuses, the administration continues to remain conspicuously silent as to its obligation to hold perpetrators accountable. Statements denouncing torture and promises that this administration will not use such tactics on detainees are better than the Bush administration's actions, but they remain insufficient and the failure to prosecute serious allegations of torture remains in violation of the United States' international obligations.
Another example of the Obama administration's marginal shifts towards rights protection is its movement of some cases from military commissions to Article III courts under the theory that federal courts are an effective venue for prosecutors to secure convictions, and they obviate the rule of law concerns concomitant with the use of specialized military commissions for terrorist acts. 25 Using Article III courts as opposed to military commissions is a shift that moves toward greater rights protection for those on trial, but the reality also includes the fact that federal prosecutors of terrorism acts have the deck stacked in their favor in terms of being able to suspend Miranda rights 25. See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., Speech at the University of California Berkeley School of Law Commencement (May 22, 2013) (transcript at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-university-california-berkeley-schoollaw). Holder noted that:
[T]hose who claim that our federal courts are incapable of handling terrorism cases are not registering a dissenting opinion. They are simply wrong. Their assertions ignore reality. And attempting to limit the use of these courts would weaken our ability to incapacitate and to punish those who target our people and attempt to terrorize our communities. Throughout history, our federal courts have proven to be an unparalleled instrument for bringing terrorists to justice. They have enabled us to convict scores of people of terrorism-related offenses since September 11. for a lengthy time, 26 use an extremely broad material support statute to convict or as leverage in plea bargain negotiations, 27 and defend against claims of entrapment with virtually guaranteed success. 28 Despite these significant limitations, some argument can be made that the Obama administration has shifted at least marginally in a rightsprotective direction on these matters; the same cannot be said for a number of other national security contexts.
C. Security Contexts in Which Exceptionalism Is at its Highest
Numerous contexts exist in which the Obama administration has either actively undermined attempts at accountability over human and civil rights abuses committed under the auspices of a national security or counterterrorism program, or has kept secret the arguably abusive programs in order to shield them from accountability. In this section, three such contexts are discussed: 29 (1) the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) for targeted killings, (2) the invocation of the state secrets privilege to seek dismissal of civil lawsuits involving sensitive government information, and (3) the use of immigration law to detain and remove noncitizens accused of a connection to terrorist activity. Each of these embodies at least one aspect of the national security exceptionalism identified above: that the type of authority claimed by the president is appropriate because it is within his unilateral purview, that terrorism poses an exceptional and unacceptable threat to the United States that must be countered forcefully, and that the United States must play an exceptional role within the counterterrorism sphere and this role may justify excessive behavior in some instances.
Drones
President Obama expanded the use of drones for targeted killings 30 of suspected terrorists during his administration. 31 Administration officials have repeatedly emphasized the necessity, efficacy, and legality of targeted killings as a counterterrorism tool, 32 and have resisted the idea that other branches of government should play a significant role over the question of who is killed by drones (citizen vs. 35 and specific questions regarding the legality of its scope in terms of geographic location and citizenship of the target. 36 The Obama administration took two positions as to the nature of the war being waged with drones that raised additional concerns: first, the assertion that the theater of war for U.S. counterterrorism efforts encompasses the entire globe; 37 and second, statements made by administration officials in early 2013 that although the country should not remain on a war footing permanently, we should expect the current counterterrorism efforts to last at least ten to twenty years longer. 38 Despite the boundless geographic and extremely broad durational scope around the targeted killing program, its parameters remain largely shielded from public view except at points at which it serves the Obama administration to make such information public. 39 Limited information has been disclosed in occasional speeches by administration officials 40 and a classified Department of Justice memorandum that was leaked in early 2013. 41 That leak prompted a May 2013 speech in which President Obama looked to defend the legality of the targeted killings program. 42 At the same time that the administration discussed and leaked aspects of the program, it also used the classified 43 nature of the program to shield itself from media inquiry 44 and from judicial accountability, using the standing doctrine and state secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of a suit challenging the constitutionality of the program. That suit was brought on behalf of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, who had been placed on the government's targeted killings list, 45 and who was later killed by a drone. 46 This hypocrisy undermined the credibility of the administration as the restorer of the rule of law and protector of human and civil , and instead invited comparisons to the Bush administration that the Obama administration likely wished to avoid for the purposes of garnering domestic and international support. 47 In his May 2013 speech, President Obama focused largely on the parameters for targeted killings, reiterating known positions of the administration that drone strikes were legal under international law standards 48 because they defended against "imminent" threats, 49 stating that U.S. citizenship is no protection against being targeted for a drone strike, 50 and making clear that he could keep as much of the drone program secret as he deemed. 51 Throughout the Obama presidency, the administration has offered only two rights-protective concessions with regard to the drone program, and neither provides significant comfort: first, in 2013, President Obama announced a plan to curtail sharply the use of signature strikes 52 in Yemen and instead use drone strikes only for those individuals targeted by the administration, 53 likely in response to media coverage of tragic civilian deaths 54 and criticism over administration prevarications as to how 23, 2014) , http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-targetanwar-al-awlaki.html.
47. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, How Obama Undermined the War on Terror, NEW REPUBLIC (May 1, 2013), www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-americansupport-counterterrorism (arguing that Obama's lack of transparency on drones and other issues has undermined U.S. efforts to build alliances that would bolster U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism goals).
48. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 5, with Holder, supra note 35, and Koh, supra note 30, at 7-8 (President Obama articulated proportionality and distinction principles that largely reflected the standards offered by Attorney General Holder and State Department Legal Adviser Koh in previous speeches).
49. May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 6 (articulating similar definitions as to the "imminence" of a perceived threat for the purposes of ordering a targeted killing).
50. Compare id., supra note 42, at 8 (noting that "the high threshold that we've set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens"), with Holder, supra note 35, at 6. 51. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 42, at 7, 10. 52. See Becker & Shane, supra note 43 (explaining that the Obama administration used "signature strikes" in Pakistan, in which groups of people engaging in apparently suspicious behavior were allowed to be targeted for a drone strike, even if no terrorists or terrorist supporters were known to be in the group). many civilians had been killed by drone strikes. 55 However, in the first half of 2015, the administration had used signature strikes in Yemen at least twelve times. 56 Second, in 2013, then-Attorney General Eric Holder conceded to Senator Rand Paul that the president does not have the authority to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat on American soil, 57 apparently leaving open the possibility of noncitizens being killed anywhere, U.S. citizens being killed outside of the United States, and U.S. citizens being killed within the United States if the administration believes that they are engaged in "combat."
Given the boundless geographic scope and lengthy predicted duration of this conflict, alongside the administration's robust defense of both the effectiveness and legality of the program, it would seem that instituting proper accountability measures-by Congress and/or the judiciary-would be essential to protect against and provide redress for arbitrary or abusive decision-making in the process of extra-judicial killings. Yet this area persists as one in which national security exceptionalism has prevailed. Congress has expressed little will in setting meaningful parameters on the program, 58 and the judiciary has shied away from adjudicating the legality of placing targets for extrajudicial killings on a government list, even if those targets are U.S. citizens who are not "imminently" attacking the United States in any conventional sense of the word. 59 would necessitate more than rhetoric about the efficacy and legality of the drone program that cannot actually be examined and verified because of executive branch secrecy. 60 
State Secrets Privilege
Focus on invocations of the state secrets privilege ramped up during President Bush's second term with the emergence of a pattern of the administration seeking dismissals of lawsuits during the pleadings stage, even when the suits dealt with allegations of extraordinary rendition, unlawful detention and torture, and the suits were the last attempts of gravely injured individuals to vindicate their rights. 61 Despite substantial evidence that citizens of Germany 62 and the United Kingdom, 63 among others, were rendered by the United States government to other nations and were subsequently abused by the security forces in the nations to which they were rendered, their civil suits have been dismissed on state secrets grounds. 64 Congress discussed reining in the executive's increasing reliance on the state secrets privilege as a means of escaping the possibility of accountability several times: it debated the State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 65 and reintroduced nearly identical reform legislation in February 2009 66 after the Obama administration appeared to adopt the Bush administration's stance in favor of a broad invocation and application of the privilege. 67 Legislative reform efforts lost momentum after the Obama administration released a new policy for the Department of Justice in September 2009 that mandated a more rigorous internal administrative review prior to invoking the state secrets privilege. 68 That policy has been in effect for six years, but it appears that the internal review process has resulted in little visible difference between the Bush and Obama administrations with regard to the invocation of the privilege at the pleadings stage in cases that often allege serious constitutional violations and human rights abuses. 69 More rigorous due process within the executive branch may indeed be more rights-protective, but because such evaluations have been kept secret and Congress and the public are not privy to that information, it appears that the Obama administration has adopted the "just trust us" view of due process that in some respects mirrors the actions of the Bush administration. 70 Further, any future administration could easily undo any rights-protective due process measures that do exist, since the current process was not undertaken legislatively and does not engage Congress or the judiciary in a meaningful way.
The use of the state secrets privilege becomes a matter of national security exceptionalism because, as in the case of torture, the Obama administration has suppressed the ability of individuals to litigate their rights and hold government actors accountable for their past abuses. Further, a variety of political and structural incentives have created a situation where exceptionalism reigns and accountability from Congress or the courts does not exist: ideological alignment with the president, concern that national security is an issue within the president's sole jurisdiction, complacency, and an overly formalistic judiciary that chooses to defer to the president instead of engaging in its counter majoritarian obligation to protect fundamental rights 71 have all contributed to the lack of engagement on the question of redress for violations of human and civil rights.
Use of Immigration Law in the National Security Context
The government has, to some extent, conflated immigration and counterterrorism programs and has encouraged use of the immigration system as an important tool in counterterrorism efforts. 72 The result has been a system that, although legal under U.S. domestic law, 73 arguably violates international law and norms with regard to the treatment of migrants, 74 and most certainly is not rights-protective of the noncitizens caught in its framework. Juxtaposed against the unilateral executive action that has attempted to offer additional protection to some immigrant populations that is the subject of other articles in this symposium, the administration has leveraged the lowered due process protections afforded to immigrants to conduct heightened surveillance, engage in racial and religious profiling, and detain and remove immigrants on a sometimes specious basis.
The government is authorized to detain any person for whom it has certified that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the person 71. See generally Setty, supra note 63 (discussing the overly formalistic approach of the judiciary with regard to government invocations of the state secrets privilege).
72. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., & James W. Ziglar, Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Announcement of INS Restructuring Plan (Nov. 14, 2001) (transcript at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_14.htm ("The INS will also be an important part of our effort to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering our country.").
73. has engaged in espionage, 75 opposition by violence, 76 or terrorist activity, 77 or is involved with an organization that is suspected of terrorist activity. 78 Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has relied heavily on immigration law and policy to detain, interrogate, control and remove suspected terrorists. 79 With fewer checks and balances, it is much easier for the government to arrest, detain, and investigate an individual under immigration law than criminal law. Unlike the U.S. criminal justice system, where defendants have the right to an attorney, the right to a speedy trial, and the presumption of innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, immigration law does not afford detainees ample protections. For example, a noncitizen is permitted to have an attorney in immigration proceedings, but counsel is not provided for the 80% of detainees in removal proceedings who are indigent. 80 Furthermore, a noncitizen can be mandatorily detained for months or years before being released or removed from the United States, and the standard for removal is that of "clear and convincing evidence," a much lower standard than the criminal justice conviction standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 81 These lesser protections have allowed federal officials to undertake several initiatives that have targeted immigrants, primarily those from Muslim-majority countries, in the name of national security. Mus-lims in the immigration system have been subjected to possibly abusive 82 preventive detention, 83 exclusion based on political views, heightened surveillance and arguably unconstitutional racial profiling. 84 Detainees in the immigration system face serious hurdles in challenging the government's case for removal due to the lower removal standard of "clear and convincing evidence" as well as the inability to access and challenge the secret evidence presented and alleged by the government. 85 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s police powers have generated a high level of scrutiny and surveillance of immigrant populations within the United States. The lowered due process protections accorded to immigrants allow for a more searching and less privacy-protective approach. Lawyers cite the presence of FBI agents during immigration proceedings, Immigration and Custom Enforcement's reliance on statements made in old FBI interviews in its decisions, and the FBI's submission of prejudicial affidavits raising national security concerns without providing the basis of the allegations. FBI agents have used the structural power imbalances inherent in the immigration processes to coerce Muslim immigrants into becoming informants, or retaliate if they refuse. 86 
II. WHY NOT NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM?
The preceding section offered both the rationales for national security exceptionalism and several examples of it. The next question must then be, why not stick with national security exceptionalism? Beyond President Obama's exhortations that national security ought not be an exceptional context, the focus here should be on the compelling problem of a lack of accountability over the commission of human and civil rights abuses. Both legal and pragmatic problems arise by categorizing national security matters as being fundamentally separate from other areas in which the administration has worked to protect or improve human and civil rights. For example, the United States has long been party to international treaties prohibiting torture and cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment, as well as extra-judicial killing and the disparate treatment of individuals based on race, ethnicity, and religious expression. Among them are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 87 the Geneva Conventions, 88 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 89 the American Convention on Human Rights, 90 and the Convention Against Torture. 91 On the domestic level, the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been interpreted as prohibiting torture, 92 and various domestic laws codify the obligations in the Convention Against Torture: the federal Torture Statute, 93 the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 94 the Alien Tort Claims Act, 95 and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. 96 There are no loopholes in international and domestic law that allow for torture, even in times of emergency. Further, international law demands that government-sanctioned torture must be investigated and prosecuted where found. The exceptionalism for the Bush administration was redefining the underlying acts so as to claim that whatever techniques were being used by interrogators on detainees did not constitute torture. 97 For the Obama administration, the exceptionalism was deciding that, despite international law obligations to the contrary, the administration would not conduct an investigation into Bush-era torture 98 and ultimately would not prosecute any of those involved. 99 The administration has remained steadfast in this position despite the evidence made public through the Senate Torture Report, 100 and has aggressively sought dismissal of civil suits alleging torture, as described above.
For targeted killings, the international legal standards are murkier. The Obama administration's stated limits on the use of drones reflect a unilateralist legal interpretation of the applicable international and domestic legal constraints; as with much of the counterterrorism power that has aggregated in the executive branch since September 2001, there is no venue for challenging the administration's legal position other than through public pressure. 101 In his May 2013 speech, President Obama stated that he welcomed a conversation with Congress about a potential drone court, but noted that, given the scope of executive power in the area of foreign policy and counterterrorism, such a court may not be constitutional. 102 Such a view provides little more than cold comfort to those seeking to protect the rights of citizens and noncitizens being targeted for extrajudicial killings in the name of counterterrorism.
For these contexts, exceptionalism cannot be justified from a purely legal perspective, so the fallback justification turns on pragmatic concerns such as whether the administration thinks particular actions-like targeted killings or the non-prosecution of those involved in torturing detainees-benefit U.S. security interests or make sense from the perspective of political viability. And in this respect, President Obama is unexceptional; many presidents have used these pragmatic, non-legal justifications for their national security actions. Perhaps the only thing exceptional about this situation is that President Obama had promised a return to a non-emergency footing for the government and a return of the primacy of the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
Some parts of President Obama's national security exceptionalism should not be surprising; he advertised as early as his first presidential campaign that, if elected, he would send drones into Pakistan to target individuals there. 103 Yet his shift on the issues identified here have created two problematic dynamics with regard to rights protection: first, President Obama's rhetoric about restoring the rule of law and curtailing the perceived abuses of executive power 104 arguably could have translated into meaningful reform that differentiated the Obama administration from the Bush administration's approach on the exercise of unilateral executive power. 105 But repeated invocations of broad executive power and the excessive secrecy that has surrounded many of the Obama administration's policies, combined with excessive deference from the judiciary 106 and a lack of action in Congress on many of these matters, has essentially given a bipartisan imprimatur to claims of extremely broad executive power, a lack of rights-protective action on behalf of those subject to unfair disparate impact by the government, and a lack of accountability for past abuses.
Second, this exceptionalism has taken and continues to take a toll on the view of the United States in the international sphere. Even before he became president, Obama signaled the desire to reengage with the international community as a matter of legal compliance (e.g., outlawing the use of so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques"), 107 as good foreign policy (i.e., restoring America's moral authority in the world) 108 and as a matter of restoring the rule of law. 109 At least since 2009, the U.S. government has looked to garner the support and loyalty of allied nations that were skeptical of Bush-era U.S. counterterrorism efforts perceived to be dismissive of the countries' own priorities and cultural norms. 110 President Obama's signing of the executive orders outlawing torture and closing the Guantánamo Bay detention facility on his first day in office were meant as strong signals that the U.S. government was responding to concerns that the United States flouted its own human rights standards, disregarded the rule of law, and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world. These changes have served not only moral interests, but the realpolitik interests of rebuilding trust and loyalty from traditionally-allied nations. 111 But continued national security exceptionalism engenders a view of the United States as considering itself to be above international obligations to investigate and prosecute torturers and war criminals, and the view by the global community that the United States is willing to apply one standard for itself, and another for the rest of the world. As such, the exceptionalism not only poses real challenges in terms of law, morality and building useful relationships with allied nations, but it acts as a step backward for the creation of enforceable international norms and standards, and a step backward in efforts to restore a balance in the rule of law when it comes to national security matters.
